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INTRODUCTION
Cities are becoming increasingly privatized.1 This phenomenon is
demonstrated by the prevalence of gated communities and
homeowner associations, which are essentially private governments
for the benefit of a subset of city residents.2 Less noticeable, however,
is the increasing privatization of municipal finance and spending.3
Rather than drawing from general tax revenue, city projects
increasingly rely on payments from residents who either most benefit
from them or make them most necessary.4
This “user pays” philosophy is especially manifest in the use of
exactions, or, more specifically, impact fees, on new developments.5
Exactions are concessions demanded of landowners before local
authorities will approve building permits.6 Traditional exactions take
the form of physical dedications of real property, such as building
roads within a subdivision or deeding the public an easement for a
bike path or for the preservation of wetlands.7 Much more common
today are impact fees, which are monetary exactions to help pay for
improvements to off-site, system-wide infrastructure or even
affordable housing projects or job training.8

1. See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 10–11 (1994) (highlighting the rise in selfgoverned developments since the end of World War II).
2. See generally id. at 122–49 (describing homeowner associations as private
governments).
3. Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation:
Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 S.M.U. L. REV. 177, 181 (2006).
4. See id. at 182, 202–04 (describing how local governments have embraced the
idea that “growth should absorb its own fiscal impacts” and have begun funding
infrastructure projects through fees imposed on the entities that make the
infrastructure necessary).
5. See id. at 210 (explaining that if impact fees are in proportion to the true cost
of providing public services and are included in housing prices, new home buyers
will internalize the positive and negative effects of their new homes).
6. Id. at 181.
7. See id. at 199–201, 206 (noting that traditional exactions can be
conceptualized “as being tied to the specific site under development”).
8. Id. at 191 n.43, 205 n.100. Impact fees go by various names, such as “in lieu
of fees, mitigation fees, water and sewer connection charges, excise taxes, privilege
tax[es], low income housing replacement fees, linkage fees, standby fees, and
transportation utility fees.” Id. at 245–46 (footnotes omitted).

CASTLEMILLER.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

THE NEW PER SE TAKINGS RULE

4/2/2014 2:49 PM

921

Exactions are justified as methods of internalizing the costs of
new growth to the developers promoting the growth.9 For
example, new development leads to increased water use, sewage,
traffic, stormwater runoff, school enrollment, and fire coverage,
among other thingsall of which will increase costs for the city.10
Without exactions, these costs would be externalized, forcing
taxpayers to bear them even though only a few developers may
make them necessary.11
This user pays logic should be attractive to those who lean
libertarian on economic matters.12 From the libertarian perspective,
members of society should not be forced to fund services from which
they do not derive a proportionate benefit.13 In other words, each
person’s contribution to services should be carefully tailored to his or
her benefit from those services.14 In the context of municipal
services, improved infrastructure more heavily benefits developers
than average individual taxpayers because the improvements increase
the city’s capacity to accommodate new residents and make

9. Joseph A. Dane, Recent Development, Maui’s Residential Workforce
Housing Policy: Finding the Boundaries of Inclusionary Zoning, 30 U. H AW . L. R EV .
447, 453 (2008).
10. Id. at 453–54, 462.
11. See id. at 453.
12. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595
(2013) (regarding exactions that “[i]nsist[] that landowners internalize the negative
externalities of their conduct” as “a hallmark of responsible land-use policy”). This
opinion was authored by Justice Alito, see id. at 2951, who is known to have libertarian
tendencies, see Illya Somin, Alito’s Libertarian Streak, AM. SPECTATOR, http://spectator.org/
articles/47794/alitos-libertarian-streak (Nov. 9, 2005) (contrasting Justice Alito with
the conservative Justice Scalia and outlining various areas of the law where Justice
Alito takes a libertarian stance); see also Simon Lazarus, Alito Shrugged: Libertarianism
Has Won Over the Supreme Court Conservatives, NEW REPUBLIC (July 28, 2013)
(describing Justices Alito, Scalia, Roberts, Thomas, and Kennedy’s growing
acceptance of libertarian social and economic positions).
13. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 5 (1985) (asserting that when the government takes value from an
individual, the just compensation provision requires the government to give that
individual “a fair equivalent” in exchange).
14. See id. at 195, 197–99 (explaining Frank Michelman’s famous implicit in-kind
compensation doctrine, which justifies regulations when they generate long-term
benefits for the parties burdened, but claiming that “[i]n a world of perfect
knowledge and costless measurement,” everyone would benefit in exact proportion
to his or her contribution, with the excess benefits of net gainers distributed to
compensate for the losses imposed on net losers); see also Frank I. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation”
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1179, 1225 (1967) (arguing that the just compensation
requirement helps ensure that, over the long run, the total net benefits conferred on
society by government action exceed the total net losses by correcting immediate
harms to some individuals).
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subsequent developments more valuable.15 Thus, developers should
shoulder a greater burden for financing these improvements than
the average taxpayer.
The same philosophy, however, has also driven a somewhat
conflicting legal current that limits exactionsthe expanding
application of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. The Takings
Clause states that “private property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”16 Since the end of the Lochner era,17
economic libertarians have sought to apply this Clause to limit
economic regulations with redistributive effectsthat is, regulations
that force some people to confer more benefits on the public than
they receive in return.18 The Court signaled some support for this
view in Armstrong v. United States,19 when Justice Black stated that the
Takings Clause “was designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.”20 Some scholars,
including Richard Epstein, propose that the Takings Clause applies
to all regulations and taxes; the effect of which would prevent the
government from demanding more money from individuals than it
dispenses in “in-kind” benefits to them.21 While this view has not
15. See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 212–13 (indicating that developers
derive financial benefit from the new infrastructure in the form of increased
property values).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52–53 (1905), the Supreme Court held
that state wage and hour regulations violated employees’ due process right to
“liberty” because they limited workers’ right to freely contract to work under the
conditions to which they voluntary consented. Over the next few decades, several
cases that followed Lochner applied a similarly strict level of scrutiny to other
economic regulations that supposedly limited the freedom to contract. See, e.g.,
Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 540, 543, 553–54 (1923) (applying the Due
Process Clause’s protection of liberty to assert the right of women and children to
contract to work for less than minimum wage).
By 1938, however, the Court had effectively reversed Lochner under pressure from
President Roosevelt’s New Deal. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An
Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 798 (2006)
(citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); and W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937) as “the three cases that overturned Lochner” (footnote omitted)). Since
then, the Court has firmly held that economic regulations satisfy the Fourteenth
Amendment as long as they have some “rational basis”—a standard nearly all
regulations satisfy. Id. at 799. But c.f. Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 481–83
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (Brown, J., concurring) (lamenting the departure from Lochner-era
protections of economic liberties), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 860 (2013).
18. See J. Freitag, Note, Takings 1992: Scalia’s Jurisprudence and a Fifth Amendment
Doctrine To Avoid Lochner Redivivus, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 743, 778–79 (1994)
(describing the use of the Takings Clause to combat redistributive measures).
19. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
20. Id. at 49.
21. EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 195–97, 284.
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taken hold in modern jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court has
gradually expanded the Takings Clause to apply to a larger scope of
economic regulations.22 As this has happened, the Takings Clause
has emerged as a potential surrogate for the rejected Lochner-era
reliance on the Due Process Clause as a tool to question
government regulations.23
At the end of the October 2012 term, these two trends converged
in dramatic fashion in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management
District.24 On its surface, the case requires impact fees to be subject to
the nexus and rough proportionality tests that already govern in-kind
exactions.25 To arrive there, however, the Court applied reasoning
that implicitly and dramatically extended the reach of the Takings
Clause sub silentio.26
This Note argues that the Koontz Court implicitly created a new and
broad per se takings rule: whenever a government attaches a
monetary obligation to specifically identified assets and the
obligation is not a “tax,” a per se taking has occurred requiring just
compensation.27 This rule will likely find explicit use in future
Takings Clause challenges to regulations.
To support this argument, Part I of this Note provides background
on the various practical and theoretical issues at play in the Koontz
decision. Part II analyzes the Koontz majority opinion to explain how
Justice Alito’s careful word choice and reasoning lead to the implicit
establishment of a new per se takings rule. It also argues that,
although defining taxes is conceptually challenging, (perhaps even
more so after the Court’s 2012 Affordable Care Act decision28)
distinguishing them from takings will not be extraordinarily difficult
in practice.

22. See Freitag, supra note 18, at 746–47 (suggesting that the regulatory takings
doctrine has been used to apply strict scrutiny in cases in which the government
regulates land use and real estate development).
23. Id. at 746–50 (explaining the transition from the Lochner Court’s use of the
Due Process Clause to limit government regulation to the modern Court’s use of the
Takings Clause).
24. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
25. See id. at 2598–99; see also infra Part I.B.2.a (describing the nexus and rough
proportionality tests).
26. See infra Part II (describing how Justice Alito’s majority opinion creates a new
per se takings rule that differs from the Court’s reasoning in previous regulatorymonetary takings cases).
27. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (explaining that this new per se
taking rule goes beyond the previous affirmation by the Court that seizures of
discrete objects are per se takings).
28. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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I.

BACKGROUND: THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND EXACTIONS

Koontz lies at the confluence of multiple emerging historical and
legal trends, touching upon both practical concerns in real estate
development and municipal finance and broader concerns over the
theoretical distinctions between takings, taxes, and legitimate policepower regulations. This Part first briefly explains the recent
evolution of the takings doctrine and its awkward relationship with
long-standing assumptions regarding taxation. It then describes the
rise of exactions as a land-use regulatory policy and the Court’s
parallel development of safeguards against “extortionate” exactions.
Finally, it summarizes Koontz and the contribution the case makes to
exactions jurisprudence.
A. Takings Versus Taxes
1.

The evolution of regulatory takings of real property and the “per se” rules
Historically, the Takings Clause has had limited applicability to
land-use regulations and related exercises of authority, such as
decisions to grant or deny permits and impose conditions on those
permits. The Court has generally considered such activities to be
within state and local governments’ Tenth Amendment police powers
to regulate in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare.29 Prior
to the early twentieth century, the Takings Clause rarely applied to
situations other than wholesale seizures of real property.30
The Takings Clause first emerged as a limitation on regulatory
authority in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.31 In that case Justice
Holmes explained that the Takings Clause requires just
compensation for not only “direct appropriation of property,”32 but
also regulations that “go[] too far” in burdening interests in real
property.33
The Court did not provide a clear standard for
determining when regulations went “too far” until Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.34 In that case, the Court developed
a rough framework for scrutinizing particularly burdensome
regulations.35 Under Penn Central, regulatory takings could be
29. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389–90 (1926)
(upholding zoning ordinances as a legitimate exercise of police power).
30. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (citing Pa. Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) as the turning point).
31. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
32. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (quoting Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457,
551 (1870)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415.
34. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
35. See id. at 124 (recounting relevant factors from previous Court decisions).
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found by analyzing three factors: (1) the regulation’s economic
impact on the property owner, (2) the regulation’s interference
with the owner’s “investment-backed expectations,” and (3) the
regulation’s character.36
However, since Penn Central, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
expressed dissatisfaction with its regulatory takings analysis as a
“difficult and uncertain rule” that requires courts to engage in
“essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries” to determine whether a taking
has occurred.37 Consequently, the Court has begun fashioning per se
rules for determining when a regulation imposed on real property
constitutes a taking.38 The per se rules apply in only a subset of
takings situations, but they help reduce the overall level of
uncertainty in takings questions by identifying certain government
actions that will always constitute takings.39
The Court established its first per se takings rule in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,40 in which the Court held that a
permanent, physical invasion, no matter how small, is always a taking
The second per se rule was
requiring just compensation.41
announced in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,42 which
provided that a regulation that denies virtually all economically
beneficial use of property is always a taking unless the regulation
prevents a common law nuisance.43 Aside from these per se rule

36. See id.; see also Eric R. Claeys, The Penn Central Test and Tensions in Liberal
Property Theory, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 339, 341–42 (2006) (“[T]hese factors are
often referred to as the Penn Central test . . . . (internal quotation marks omitted)).
37. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt.
Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600 (2013) (refusing to apply the Penn Central test) (quoting
E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 542 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part))).
38. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1030–31 (1992)
(establishing the “total taking” per se rule); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426, 432 (1982) (establishing the “permanent physical
occupation” per se takings rule); see also Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2195 (2004) (describing the Court’s adoption of per se
takings rules as an effort to combat the “indeterminacy” of the Penn Central test).
39. See Peñalver, supra note 38, at 2195–96.
40. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
41. See id. at 436–38 & n.16, 441 (holding that a city ordinance requiring
landlords to permit the installation of a cable television equipment on their
apartment buildings was a taking, even though the equipment only occupied roughly
one and a half cubic feet of the property).
42. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
43. See id. at 1008–09, 1027–32 (holding that South Carolina’s Beachfront
Management Act, which prohibited the “construction of occupiable improvements”
in designated coastal areas, constituted a taking because it deprived the plaintiff’s
land of all economically beneficial use and thus, in effect, deprived the plaintiff of
the land itself).
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situations, however, landowners can only bring Fifth Amendment
challenges against regulations under the Penn Central analysis.44
2.

The (difficult) distinction between takings of cash and taxation
To a more limited degree, courts have applied takings law not only
to real property interests but also to personal property, such as cash,
as long as the cash is taken from “a specific, separately identifiable”
source of assets.45 For example, seizing a security interest, such as a
lien, is a taking because a security interest represents a right to
receive money by attachment to a specific piece of property.46 Also,
the Court has considered seizing interest earned from specifically
identified bank accounts a “per se taking.”47
However, general financial obligations imposed without reference
to discrete assets are not takings.48 This principle was illustrated in
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,49 in which five Justices declined to apply the
Takings Clause to the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of
199250 (“Coal Act”). Pursuant to the Coal Act, a mining company was
required to pay into a benefit fund for its former miners.51 Justice
Kennedy’s opinion, which is the controlling opinion on the
question,52 explained that monetary obligations could only be takings

44. See id. at 1015 (explaining that a regulatory challenge will be analyzed under
Penn Central’s “case-specific inquiry,” unless the particular regulatory action fits into
one of the designated categories covered by a per se rule).
45. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 554–55 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citing Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980)).
46. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 46–48 (1960) (ship
lien); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601–02 (1935)
(home mortgage).
47. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 234–35 (2003)
(interest earned from funds in IOLTA accounts); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S.
at 164–65 (interest accrued on an interpleader fund while in a court’s registry).
Calling such takings “per se takings” should not be confused with the per se taking
rules described supra Part I.A.1. The latter apply to regulations affecting real
property, not individual seizures of personal property, such as bank accounts.
48. See generally Peñalver, supra note 38, at 2206–08 (discussing the distinction the
Court has made between general financial obligations and obligations attached to
discrete assets).
49. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
50. See id. at 553–54 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that his opinion, which
was joined by three other Justices, as well as Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion,
both argued that the Takings Clause did not apply).
51. See id. at 516–17 (plurality opinion).
52. In Koontz, the Supreme Court quietly resolved a significant division of
authority on which Eastern Enterprises opinion was controlling on this issue. Compare
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013) (relying on
Justice Kennedy’s opinion to evaluate whether monetary obligations can be takings),
with Peñalver, supra note 38, at 2208 & n.115 (collecting cases on the lower court
split over the controlling opinion in Eastern Enterprises).
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when “a specific property right or interest [was] at stake.”53 The Coal
Act, however, “d[id] not operate upon or alter an identified property
interest,” nor was it “applicable to or measured by a property
interest.”54 Justice Kennedy explained that extending the takings
doctrine to general financial obligations such as the one at issue
would potentially interfere with taxation and other governmental
actions traditionally granted wide discretion based on their necessity
to effective governance.55
Despite the nearly identical nature of taxes and regulatory takings
in some instances, the Court has granted taxes a much more
deferential standard of review than takings, whereby taxes are upheld
as long as they are not arbitrary and irrational.56 Courts employ this
level of deference even for special assessments, which are taxes
intended to recover the costs of public projects from a narrow group
of taxpayers who most benefit from them.57 As long as the taxpayers
receive some benefit from the projects, the Court has not regarded
assessments as takings.58

53. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 541 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part). A four-Justice plurality (Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia,
and Thomas) believed that general financial obligations, such as this one, should be
subject to Takings Clause scrutiny. See id. at 503–04. Justice Kennedy concurred in
the result because he believed the obligation violated due process but declined
to apply the Takings Clause. Id. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part). The remaining four Justices (Breyer, Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg) also rejected application of the Takings Clause. Id. at 554
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 540.
55. See id. at 543 (warning against the expansion of the Takings Clause to the
point of “los[ing] sight of the importance of identifying the property allegedly
taken, lest all governmental action be subjected to examination under the
constitutional prohibition against taking without just compensation, with the
attendant potential for money damages”).
56. See, e.g., Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1916) (declaring
that a tax would have to be “so arbitrary as to constrain to the conclusion that it was
not the exertion of taxation, but a confiscation of property” before the Court would
find it unconstitutional); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819)
(explaining that the structure of the government would prevent abuse of the power
to tax because the taxpayers could vote); see also Peñalver, supra note 38, at 2199
(explaining that the Supreme Court has repeatedly denied Takings Clause
challenges to allegedly excessive taxes).
57. Peñalver, supra note 38, at 2202; see, e.g., Houck v. Little River Drainage
Dist., 239 U.S. 254, 262 (1915) (asserting that a state legislature was free to
apportion the cost of installing drainage among the counties in which the
improvements were to be made).
58. See, e.g., Houck, 239 U.S. at 265 (finding, in contrast to Epstein’s view, that
“there is no [constitutional] requirement . . . that for every payment there must be
an equal benefit”); see also Eric Kades, Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings: The
Continuous Burdens Principle, and Its Broader Application, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 189, 258
(2002) (“[E]ven a slight, tenuous correlation between the amount paid in taxes or
assessments on the one hand, and the benefits received on the other hand, is
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The extension of the Takings Clause to include governmentimposed financial obligations has made it very difficult to find a
consistent normative framework to distinguish taxes from takings.59
Nevertheless, as this Note demonstrates, there are functional
solutions to the problem that, while not conceptually attractive,
appear adequate to serve their purpose.60
B. Exactions
As the takings doctrine has expanded, it has gradually subjected
exactions to greater judicial scrutiny. Exactions have simultaneously
expanded in force to become a primary application of local
governments’ police powers and, indirectly, their ability to raise revenue.
1.

The rise of impact fees
While exactions have been employed in some form since the
colonial period,61 they have become especially prevalent in the late
twentieth century.62 Significantly, exactions have been considered
land-use regulations and therefore arise out of the police power to
regulate in the interests of public health, safety, and welfare—not out
of the power to tax.63 Monetary exactions, or impact fees, therefore,
are principally justified as regulatory mechanisms for dealing with
new growth; though, practically speaking, they have become a crucial
source of revenue.64
Over the last few decades, impact fees have become increasingly
prevalent for several reasons.65 Perhaps most significantly, traditional
sources of local government revenue, such as transfers from state
governments and taxation, have dried up considerably as voters have

sufficient to shield a measure from a takings challenge.”); supra notes 12–15, 21 and
accompanying text (describing Epstein’s libertarian viewpoint).
59. See Peñalver, supra note 38, at 2183–91 (covering scholars’ attempts to
consistently distinguish between taxes and takings, concluding that the distinction is
impossible under the Court’s precedent, and arguing that courts should therefore
scale back their application of the Takings Clause); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at
283–84 (agreeing that the distinction is impossible but instead concluding that taxes
should be subject to the Takings Clause).
60. See infra Part.II.B (describing various functional solutions for distinguishing
taxes from takings).
61. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 192–93 (listing the various ways in which colonial
communities exercised regulatory control over land usage).
62. See id. at 201–04 (indicating that this shift began “in the post-World War II era”).
63. Id. at 204.
64. See id. at 209–10.
65. A Government Accountability Office survey from 2000 showed that 59.4%
(564) of cities with populations over 25,000 and 39% (238) of metropolitan area
counties used impact fees. Id. at 207. States with impact fee enabling legislation
increased from three in 1986 to twenty-four by 2002. Id. at 207 n.106.
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pushed for lower taxes at both the state and local level.66 Moreover,
local governments have acquired more autonomy through “home
rule” movements,67 which have increased those governments’
regulatory and revenue-raising authority.68 Twenty-eight states have
enacted legislation specifically empowering local governments to
charge impact fees,69 and, in many states, local governments have
charged impact fees even in the absence of such legislation.70 Local
governments impose impact fees as either part of a broad legislative
scheme or “ad hoc”—that is, in the course of negotiations with
individual landowners.71
Additionally, impact fees allow for much more efficient city
planning than traditional possessory dedications of land. Unless
developments are very large, possessory dedications are often too
small and inadequately placed to address the burdens imposed by
new developments to any substantial degree.72 Most of the effects of
new development are felt system-wide, requiring improvements to
water and sewage treatment plants, roads and public transportation,
schools and fire stations, and other infrastructure for which
easements would be inadequate.73 Having cash upfront also allows
local governments to begin making these improvements in advance
of the new residents arriving.74
Finally, on perhaps a more cynical note, impact fees are a more
politically achievable method for local governments to raise

66. Id. at 180, 188 & n.36 (observing that local taxes as a percentage of total
locally generated government revenue have dropped from nearly 43.6% in 1960 to
34.1% in 2002).
67. The home rule movement is a recent trend that allows local governments to
obtain more authority over local matters. Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder,
455 U.S. 40, 71 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68. See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 188 (citing miscellaneous non-tax charges as a
significant source of local government revenue).
69. Clancy Mullen, State Impact Fee Enabling Acts 1, IMPACTFEES.COM (Aug. 21, 2012),
http://www.impactfees.com/publications%20pdf/state_enabling_acts.pdf; see, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.05 (2012) (“A municipality may assess development fees to
offset costs to the municipality associated with providing necessary public services to
a development . . . .”); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66001 (West 2007) (establishing that local
agencies may “impos[e] a fee as a condition of approval of a development project”
provided the agency fulfills certain requirements); 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10505-A (West
2000) (enabling municipalities to adopt impact fee ordinances).
70. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 207 n.106 (noting that Florida has a history of
court challenges to impact fees imposed without specific enabling authority and that
Virginia localities use the rezoning process to obtain “voluntary” cash exactions from
land developers).
71. Mark S. Dennison, Annotation, Zoning: Challenge to Imposition of Development
Exactions, 36 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 417, § 3 (2013).
72. Id.
73. See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 209–10.
74. See id.
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revenue.75 Impact fees disproportionately affect people outside the
voting constituencies of city officials because they are imposed on
new developments.76 Imposing charges on new developments will
typically constrain the supply of new housing despite rising demand,
requiring “outsiders” to pay more to purchase property in the city.77
These outsiders, however, will have no control over the derivation of
city revenues until they become voting residents.78 Once they become
residents, they have an incentive to support the very development
charges that made it difficult for them to purchase property because
the charges will continue to keep the supply of housing low, driving up
the value of their newly purchased homes.79
2.

Judicial scrutiny of exactions
a.

Nollan and Dolan: The nexus and rough proportionality tests

Consonant with its expanded application of the Takings Clause,
the Supreme Court has sought to reign in “extortionate” exactions to
ensure that they do not exceed the amount required to internalize
the costs imposed on the public by development. First, in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission,80 the Court demanded that an exaction
75. See id. at 208–09.
76. See id. (noting that impact fees enable “local governments [to] simultaneously
achieve a series of attractive political objectives, and [that] they do so without having
to consider any potential objections from interest groups unrepresented in the
existing voting populace”).
77. Richard A. Epstein, The Spurious Constitutional Distinction Between Takings and
Regulation, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GRPS., Dec. 2010, at 11, 13–14 (arguing
that local residents can rally political support to prevent new arrivals much more
easily than developers); see also Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 182 & n.21 (describing
scholars’ arguments that impact fees lead to exclusion). Additionally, there is some
evidence that developers pass on some of the impact fees to the new residents in the
form of higher sale prices. See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 211–14 (listing various
empirical studies analyzing the economic effects of development impact fees).
78. See Epstein, supra note 77, at 14.
79. See id. (explaining that the political process behind property regulations
allows existing residents to become “a group of privileged incumbents who can raise
the value of their own homes at the expense of [outsiders] who are forced to find
very marginal accommodations at extremely high rents”); see also Nicole Stelle
Garnett, Trouble Preserving Paradise?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 158, 177 (2001) (describing
how controls on growth benefit existing homeowners by limiting the supply of
housing and passing the costs to new arrivals). But see Vicki Been, Impact Fees and
Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES., no. 1, 2005, at 139, 146–47
(observing that there is little empirical evidence that impact fees exclude the poor or
minorities).
There is, of course, a countervailing force encouraging local
governments to allow development: new development brings more economic activity
and jobs and accompanying increases in tax revenue. See Kelo v. City of New
London, 843 A.2d 500, 520 (Conn. 2004) (determining that urban redevelopment
plans have a public purpose because of the increased taxes and jobs that result from
economic development), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
80. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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have a “nexus” to its stated objective.81 In that case, the Nollans,
homeowners owning a portion of beachfront property, sought a
building permit from the California Coastal Commission (“CCM”) to
expand their home.82 In response, the CCM conditioned approval of
the permit on the Nollans’ granting an easement across a portion of
the beach running along the back of their property so that the public
could walk freely along the beach.83 The CCM claimed that the
easement would compensate the public for the loss of “visual access” to
the beach that the Nollans’ proposed expansion would cause.84
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia noted that the easement had
no rational connection to the purposes the CCM said it would serve.85
An easement across the beach would only allow those patrons already
walking along the beach to continue walking along the portion that
crossed the Nollans’ property.86 Such an easement would not
improve these patrons’ visual access to the beach because they were
already on the beach.87 Thus, the exaction imposed by the CCM
had no “nexus” to any purported burden the housing improvements
would cause.88 The Court explicitly reserved judgment on the
precise degree of nexus required because, in Nollan, absolutely no
nexus was present.89
The answer to the degree of nexus question came in Dolan v. City of
Tigard,90 in which the Court determined that an exaction must have a
“rough proportionality” in degree to the burden it mitigated.91 In
that case, the City of Tigard, Oregon, conditioned a building permit
for the expansion of a hardware store on the owner’s granting an
easement for a greenway92 and bike path along the adjacent
floodplain of a creek.93 The City Planning Commission explained
that the greenway would mitigate the damage of stormwater runoff
from the increase in impervious surface area and that the bike path
would reduce the increase in traffic that the development would
81. See id. at 837–38.
82. Id. at 827–28.
83. Id. at 828.
84. Id. at 838.
85. Id. at 838–39.
86. Id. at 838.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 837.
89. Id. at 838.
90. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
91. Id. at 386, 391.
92. A greenway is a strip of land preserved for recreational use or environmental
preservation. Greenway Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/greenway (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
93. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379–80.
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cause by providing people with a greater ability to ride their bicycles
to the store.94 The Court held that while the obligations the city
imposed on the land owner, Dolan, had a nexus to the burdens her
development would cause to the community, the city had not
provided sufficient data to demonstrate that the exaction was roughly
proportional in degree to the burden it addressed.95
b.

Unconstitutional conditions

The Court in Dolan grounded the nexus and rough proportionality
tests on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.96 Under this
doctrine, the “government may not grant a benefit on the condition
that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the
government may withhold that benefit altogether.”97 Prior to the
New Deal, the doctrine was used to protect economic liberties,
though its primary application post-1930s has been in the First
Amendment context.98 For example, a public college cannot decline
to renew a professor’s contract (a type of government benefit) on the
condition that she stop criticizing the college’s administration, which
is her right under the First Amendment’s protection of speech.99
Even if the college has no obligation to renew the contract in the first
place, it cannot condition renewal on the surrender of her First
Amendment rights.100
In the exactions context, the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine means that a government cannot condition a building
permit (a benefit) on the landowner’s surrender of constitutional
rights.101 The constitutional rights surrendered in Nollan and
94. Id. at 381–82.
95. Id. at 394–96.
96. See id. at 385.
97. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 H ARV . L. REV.
1413, 1415 (1989).
98. See id. at 1416 (“Untouched by the falling rubble as the New Deal leveled and
rebuilt the substantive priorities of constitutional liberty, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions reemerged under the Warren Court to protect personal
liberties of speech, association, religion, and privacy just as it once had protected the
economic liberties of foreign corporations and private truckers.”); see also Dolan, 512
U.S. at 407 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that this doctrine, most frequently
arising in First Amendment cases, is not as “well settled” as the majority makes it
seem because it has been applied inconsistently throughout its history).
99. Cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 595–97 (1972) (applying the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions where a college declined to renew the contract of a
professor who was an outspoken critic of the college).
100. See id., at 596–97 (explaining that the doctrine precludes the state from
achieving indirectly that which it could not achieve directly by conditioning a benefit
on the forfeiture of a constitutional right).
101. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594,
2598–99 (2013) (providing, as an example how the doctrine applies in the
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Dolan were the landowners’ Fifth Amendment rights to just
compensation for takings.102
Discovering how the landowners were required to give up this right
can be somewhat nuanced but is crucial for understanding how the
Supreme Court has reshaped takings law. To determine whether the
government has asked landowners to surrender their right to just
compensation, courts must first decide whether a Fifth Amendment
taking would have occurred if the government, instead of asking for
the thing it wanted (such as an easement or money) in exchange for
permit approval, simply took the thing outright by force, regardless
of whether the government granted (or the landowner sought) a
permit in return.103 In Nollan and Dolan, both permit conditions were
for easements.104 Forcing a property owner to provide an easement is
a per se taking—an action for which the government would need to
exercise eminent domain105 to condemn the easement and
compensate the property owner for its value.106 Thus, conditioning
building permit approval on the surrender of an easement without
paying just compensation is essentially conditioning a government
benefit on the surrender of a constitutional right.107 The government
would be acquiring for free that for which it is ordinarily
constitutionally obligated to pay.108
Thus, from Nolan and Dolan, the Court reasoned that conditioning
permit approval on the surrender of an easement violates the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Rather than banning the
practice altogether or requiring the local government to pay the
value of the easement, the Court permitted such exactions but

exactions context, a state’s “conditioning a building permit on the owner’s
deeding over a public right-of-way” in order to “pressure an owner into
voluntarily giving up property for which the Fifth Amendment would otherwise
require just compensation”).
102. Id. at 2594.
103. See id. at 2598–99.
104. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 394 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
105. “Eminent domain” is “[t]he inherent power of a governmental entity to take
privately owned property, esp[ecially] land, and convert it to public use, subject to
reasonable compensation for the taking.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 601 (9th ed.
2009). The Supreme Court has characterized the Takings Clause as “a tacit
recognition of [this] preexisting power to take private property for public use, rather
than a grant of new power.” United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241–42 (1946).
106. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384.
107. See id. at 384–85 (articulating the violated constitutional right as the “right to
receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use”).
108. See id. at 384–85 (detailing the requirement for the government to pay for
land it acquires).
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subjected them to the nexus and rough proportionality tests.109
Essentially, the exactions must have a nexus and be roughly
proportional to the degree of harm the exaction would mitigate from
the development to pass constitutional muster.110
c. Monetary exactions: Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District
Dolan left unanswered a significant question for local governments:
should courts apply the nexus and rough proportionality tests arising
from Nollan and Dolan to impact fees? The exactions in Nollan and
Dolan were possessory dedications of real property interests—in those
cases easements—not exactions of money.111 The Court finally
109. This decision was not arbitrary. The nexus and rough proportionality tests,
at least theoretically, ensure that the exactions provide in-kind substitutes for just
compensation: To satisfy these tests, an exaction must (1) impose (roughly) no
more of a burden on the landowner than necessary to offset the burdens the
development imposes on the community; (2) confer special benefits on the
landowner that are (roughly) equal to or greater than the value of the exaction; or
(3) both. If it does these things, the landowner essentially is receiving just
compensation. In the first situation, the exaction merely makes the landowner
compensate for externalized costs that, if not prevented, would be justly owed to
his or her neighbors. In the second, the landowner receives “in-kind” benefits
roughly equaling the monetary value of the exacted property. See Richard A.
Epstein, The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 477, 489–
90 (1995) (acknowledging that the nexus and rough proportionality tests help
ensure regulations deliver benefits that at least partially compensate affected
landowners but arguing that, as a practical matter, the benefits will generally not
equal full just compensation).
110. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 391.
111. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 256. State courts were significantly divided over
this question. Compare Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930
P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (distinguishing Dolan and holding that the
nexus and rough proportionality tests are inapplicable to monetary exactions),
McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (same), and Waters
Landing Ltd. P’ship v. Montgomery Cnty., 650 A.2d 712, 724 (Md. 1994) (same),
with Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 1996) (holding that
monetary exactions are subject to the nexus and rough proportionality tests), and
Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 635–40
(Tex. 2004) (same).
The Dolan Court also left a second, equally important question unaddressed. In
both Nollan and Dolan, the exactions were ad hoc adjudicative decisions made in the
context of individual negotiations with landowners. Would the nexus and rough
proportionality tests also apply to exactions made under a broadly applicable
legislative plan? In Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, the California Supreme Court
addressed both questions at once when it held that individually negotiated monetary
exactions were subject to the nexus and rough proportionality tests, while
legislatively imposed fees were subject to a less stringent “reasonable relationship”
test. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 433.
With the exception of Texas, states have spoken with a much more uniform voice
on the second question. Compare Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz., 930 P.2d at 1000
(holding that the tests are inapplicable to legislatively enacted exactions), San Remo
Hotel L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002) (same), Krupp v.
Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 695–96 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (same),
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confronted this question in June 2013 in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District.
i.

Background

In 1994, Coy Koontz sought permission to develop 3.7 of his 14.9
acres of property near Orlando, Florida.112 Because most of his
property was technically classified as wetlands, Koontz had to apply to
the St. Johns River Water Management District (“the District”) for
special permits, even though the section he wanted to develop had
virtually no standing water or diverse wildlife to protect.113 Koontz
approached the District offering to deed eleven acres of the property
to the state as a conservation easement, which would have foreclosed
any future development of those acres.114
The District rejected his offer and suggested other concessions he
might provide in return for the permit.115 Specifically, it said he
could either limit his development to one acre, add certain on-site
improvements to mitigate stormwater runoff, and deed a
conservation easement for the remaining 13.9 acres; or he could
develop the full 3.7 acres and pay approximately $10,000116 for
improvements to fifty acres of District-owned wetlands several miles
away.117
Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass’n v. DeKalb Cnty., 588 S.E.2d 694, 697 (Ga. 2003)
(same), Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996) (same), and Homebuilders Ass’n of Metro. Portland v. Tualatin Hills
Park & Rec. Dist., 62 P.3d 404, 409 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (same), with Town of Flower
Mound, 135 S.W.3d at 640–41 (declining to limit the tests to legislatively enacted
exactions but acknowledging that, to the court’s knowledge, every other state high
court disagrees). Courts in the former category have granted more deference to
legislatively imposed fees because they are typically applied more uniformly, which
leaves less room for extortion, and because they are more subject to the democratic
process. See San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 105; Tualatin Hills, 62 P.3d at 409–10.
112. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591–92 (2013).
113. Id. at 2592–93 (explaining that the only standing water in the section of
property that Koontz planned to develop had collected in tire ruts along an unpaved
road). This condition was caused by development around Koontz’s property,
including development undertaken by the government itself. See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 3–4, Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No. 11-1447).
114. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592–93.
115. Id. at 2593.
116. See Petitioner/Appellant’s Initial Brief on the Merits at 39, St. Johns River
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC09-713) (referencing
an appraisal that devalued the property at this amount based on the mitigation
requirements). Koontz supplied another expert who estimated that the work
would have cost between $90,000 and $150,000. Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 113, at 4.
117. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593. Thus, as Justice Alito explained, the actual
exaction was the requirement to pay cash (to improve the District’s land) in return
for the right to develop on 2.7 acres, because the District’s first option had already
permitted Koontz to build on one of the acres without paying cash. Id. at 2598.
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Koontz declined both options and filed a lawsuit in which he
argued that the conditions the District placed on his permit approval
were excessive.118 The state trial court evaluated the offsite mitigation
requirement under the nexus and rough proportionality tests and
found that the conditions failed to meet either.119 On appeal, the
Florida Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding, in relevant
part, that the nexus and rough proportionality tests should only apply
to exactions of real property interests, not to monetary exactions.120
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this question.121
ii. Reasoning: Cash as a per se taking
Just as it did in previous exactions cases, the Court in Koontz
invoked the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.122 Following the
reasoning discussed above,123 Justice Alito, writing for the majority,
observed that an exaction only qualifies as an unconstitutional
condition if a simple outright seizure of the thing requested (in this
case money) would constitute a Fifth Amendment taking.124 Thus, he
analyzed whether the government would have committed a taking if

118. Id. at 2593. The dissenting Justices in Koontz based their opinion partly on a
different understanding of the facts. According to the dissent, the District merely
offered suggestions in the course of negotiating with Koontz, but these suggestions
never materialized into an actual condition. See id. at 2610–11 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting). From the dissent’s perspective, Koontz simply walked out and sued
before any final demand was given. Id. at 2611. The dissent and several
commentators have observed that this feature may mean that Koontz will have a
severe chilling effect on local governments’ willingness to negotiate at all with
developers lest their offers be construed as final conditions over which property
owners sue them. See id. (“If every suggestion could become the subject of a lawsuit
under Nollan and Dolan, [a] lawyer [representing a local government] can give but
one recommendation: Deny the permits, without giving [the applicant] any advice—
even if he asks for guidance.”); see, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Op-Ed., A Legal Blow to
Sustainable Development, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/
27/opinion/a-legal-blow-to-sustainable-development.html (siding with the dissent
and arguing that local officials will avoid all discussion related to permit conditions).
119. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593; see Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., No.
CIO 94-5673, 2002 WL 34724739 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2002).
120. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593–94; see Koontz, 77 So. 3d at 1229–30.
121. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593–94; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note
113, at i–ii. The Court also addressed another significant question that is not
central to the purpose of this Note: whether the fact that Koontz never accepted
the District’s offer, thus never submitting to any taking of his property, meant that
he could not bring a claim under Nollan and Dolan. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595–
96. The Court decided unanimously that he could. See id. (holding that
landowners do not have to accept an extortionate exaction to challenge it as
unconstitutional); see also id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the
majority with respect to this issue).
122. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594, 2598–99.
123. See supra Part I.B.2.b (explaining the application of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine).
124. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598–99;
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it simply forced Koontz to pay instead of making payment a condition
for permit approval.125 As demonstrated earlier, previous cases have
only considered such monetary obligations to be takings when they
“operate[d] upon or alter[ed] an identified property interest” or
were “applicable to or measured by a property interest,” such as
interest derived from a specifically identified bank account.126
The “fulcrum” in Koontz, Justice Alito explained, “turn[ed] on . . .
the direct link between the government’s demand and a specific
parcel of real property.”127 He explained that, unlike in Eastern
Enterprises, the demand for money “did ‘operate upon . . . an
identified property interest’ by directing the owner of a particular
piece of property to make a monetary payment” such that “the
monetary obligation burdened petitioner’s ownership of a specific
parcel of land.”128 The link between the “demand and a specific
parcel of real property” invoked use of the Nollan and Dolan tests to
prevent the government from “diminishing without justification the
value of the property.”129
Justice Alito’s reasoning perplexed Justice Kagan, who could not
see how, if the money had been demanded outright—that is, not as a
permit condition—it would have been in any way “linked” to a
specific parcel of land sufficient to qualify as a Fifth Amendment
taking.130 According to her dissent, the link could not be that the
money opened up the opportunity to build on the land; such a
determination would entail viewing the demand within the permit
context instead of as a simple outright requirement.131
The
unconstitutional conditions doctrine required the Court to ask
whether the demand for money would be a Fifth Amendment taking
if made by itself (not in exchange for a government benefit), which,
under previous cases, could only be established if it was somehow
attached to a specific parcel of property.132 Justice Kagan explained
that Koontz could have paid the money out of any source he chose;
he did not need to dispose of a specific real property interest or
derive money out of any other identified property source to make the
125. Id. at 2598–99.
126. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540–41 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment and dissenting in part); see supra notes 45–55 and accompanying text
(discussing the cases in which the Court has held that a taking occurred).
127. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600.
128. Id. at 2599 (emphasis added) (quoting E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)).
129. Id. at 2600.
130. See id. at 2605–07 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2606–07 & n.1.
132. Id.
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payment.133 Thus, the requirement to pay would have simply been a
general monetary obligation, falling squarely outside the limits Justice
Kennedy imposed in Eastern Enterprises.134 Therefore, according to
Justice Kagan, no underlying taking existed on which to base the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.135
In response, Justice Alito attempted to clarify by explaining that
“[t]he unconstitutional conditions analysis requires us to set aside
petitioner’s permit application, not his ownership of a particular
parcel of real property.”136 Justice Kagan, in turn, called this
sentence “mysterious”137 and reiterated that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine only applies “if imposing a condition
directly—i.e., independent of an exchange for a government
benefit—would violate the Constitution,” and Eastern Enterprises
held that it would not.138
Justice Kagan also observed how conceptually difficult it would be
to distinguish taxation from the characterization of takings Justice
Alito was advancing.139 A property tax, after all, is a monetary
obligation placed on a specific parcel of propertythe very thing
Justice Alito considered to be a taking.140 Justice Alito dismissed this
argument by observing that taxes had been categorically excluded
from takings scrutiny for some time and that courts have had little
difficulty distinguishing between taxes and takings case-by-case.141
Justice Kagan is not alone in her mystification over Justice Alito’s
reasoning. Since Koontz, scholars seem to interpret Justice Alito’s
opinion in the same way—viewing the building permit as the link
between the money and the land.142 As demonstrated by Justice
133. Id. at 2605–06.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2604–07.
136. Id. at 2600 n.2 (majority opinion).
137. Understandably, in this author’s opinion.
138. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2607 n.1 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2607–08.
140. Id. (“The question . . . ‘bristles with conceptual difficulties.’ And practical
ones, too: How to separate orders to pay money from . . . well, orders to pay money,
so that a locality knows what it can (and cannot) do.” (citation omitted) (quoting E.
Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 556 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting))).
141. Id. at 2601–02 & n.3 (majority opinion); see also infra notes 177–82 and
accompanying text (describing how courts have made this distinction).
142. See, e.g., Edurardo Peñalver, A Few More Thoughts About Koontz, PRAWFSBLAWG
(June 26, 2013, 4:39 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/06/takingsand-taxes-after-koontz.html (interpreting the money’s role in acquiring the permit as its
link to the land and noting that Alito’s opinion brings the permit application, rather
than the demand, to the forefront); Tejinder Singh, Opinion Recap: Broadening Property
Owners’ Right To Sue, SCOTUSBLOG (July 1, 2013, 2:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com
/2013/07/opinion-recap-broadening-property-owners-right-to-sue (claiming that the
link between the demand and the property arises out of the permitting process).
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Kagan’s dissent, however, this cannot be the case; the link to the land
must be something else to make the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions applicable.143 The next section argues that Justice Alito’s
(admittedly opaque) wording suggests a different understanding—
one that both explains why monetary exactions violate the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions and creates a new per se takings rule that
dramatically advances the Takings Clause as a tool for challenging
economic regulations.
II. DEMYSTIFYING KOONTZ AND DERIVING THE NEW PER SE RULE
The link Justice Alito saw between Koontz’s property and the
monetary obligation had nothing to do with the permitting process.
Instead, the link simply had to do with the obligation’s attachment to
the owner of a specific parcel of property.
To understand this reasoning, assume the hypothetical required by
the unconstitutional conditions test is true: the District approaches
Koontz and requires him to pay money simply because he owns that
specific parcel of property, not because he seeks a building permit and
not under any taxation authority. In Justice Alito’s view, the words
“because he owns that specific parcel of property” would be the only
link that is necessary to establish the connection to the land.144 In
other words, the financial obligation is a taking simply because it is
made in reference to a specific piece of property, burdening whomever
owns the property, and, therefore, burdening the property itself.
This is a looser connection than the Court has previously accepted
in “regulatory-monetary takings” cases like Eastern Enterprises.
Previously, the surrender of money corresponded to the surrender of
an interest or right in a piece of property.145 In this hypothetical,
however, the monetary obligation merely places a burden on whoever
owns the property but does not require the surrender of any
identifiable interest or right in the property.146 Additionally, in
143. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2607 & n.1, 2611 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (lambasting the
majority’s application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to “a run-of-themill denial of a land-use permit”).
144. See id. at 2599–2600 (majority opinion) (explaining that the demand would
constitute a taking because it would be “directing the owner of a particular piece of
property to make a monetary payment”).
145. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment and dissenting in part) (explaining that in previous monetary takings
cases, “a specific property right or interest had been at stake,” such as air rights for
high rises, the right to mine coal, and liens on real property).
146. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the
District did not require Koontz to surrender a real property interest). But cf. id. at
2600 (majority opinion) (explaining that the obligation does diminish “the value of
the property” (emphasis added)).
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previous cases, the demand for money identified particular assets as
the source from which the money had to be derived.147 Here, the
landowner could choose whether to satisfy the demand by using the
specifically named assets or some other desired source.148
These differences from previous “regulatory-monetary takings”
cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has implicitly accepted a
new per se takings rule: a government-imposed monetary obligation
attached to specifically identified assets is a per se taking, unless it is a tax.149
In other words, any time the government requires the owner of
property X to pay Y, and Y is not a tax, Y is a taking requiring just
compensation. The Court appears to have created this rule sub
silentio simply by “begging the question,” that is, assuming the rule’s
existence and relying on it to derive its holding in Koontz.
A. The Rationale for the New Per Se Rule
This new per se rule can first be found under a careful reading of
Justice Alito’s words in Koontz. Justice Alito explained that the
hypothetical direct demand for money would satisfy the requirements
of Eastern Enterprises “by directing the owner of a particular piece of property
to make a monetary payment.”150 This word choice suggests that the
key feature of this particular monetary obligation was that it attached
to a piece of land, regardless of who owned it. Justice Alito also
explained that the Court’s key concern was that the monetary
obligation would “diminish[] . . . the value of the property.”151 He
thereby highlighted how the monetary obligation attached to the
property and therefore burdened the property even if it passed to a
new owner.152 Justice Alito also viewed this kind of monetary
obligation as a per se taking: “when the government commands the
relinquishment of funds linked to a specific, identifiable property
147. Id. at 2606 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
148. See id. at 2606–07 (distinguishing the situation in Koontz from previous
cases in which a taking occurred because Koontz was free to use “whatever
source he chose—a checking account, shares of stock, a wealthy uncle”—to
satisfy the required payment).
149. This rule is one degree removed from Professor Thomas Merrill’s proposed
distinction between taxes and takings, which states that only seizures of “discrete
asset[s]” are Fifth Amendment Takings. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of
Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 974 (2000). This appears to be the position
propounded in Eastern Enterprises, and it is further supported after Koontz. Koontz
seems to leap even further ahead—not only are seizures of discrete assets per se
takings, but monetary obligations attached to discrete assets are as well.
150. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 2600.
152. Koontz presented an appraisal to show that the obligation had in fact
reduced the value of his property by $10,000. Petitioner/Appellant’s Initial Brief on
the Merits, supra note 116, at 39.
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interest such as a bank account or parcel of real property, a ‘per se
[takings] approach’ is the proper mode of analysis under the
Court’s precedent.”153
Acknowledging this rule also demystifies Justice Alito’s response to
Justice Kagan that “[t]he unconstitutional conditions analysis
requires us to set aside petitioner’s permit application, not his
ownership of a particular parcel of real property.”154 Clearly, Justice
Alito’s focus was on the fact that the monetary obligation was
imposed merely because Koontz owned the specific property that he
did; not because he applied for a building permit. The new per se
rule applied, therefore, because the financial obligation was made
with reference to the owner of a particular, identified piece of land
and it was not a tax.
Once this per se rule is acknowledged, holding that monetary
exactions are subject to the nexus and rough proportionality tests
follows by way of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Since a
direct obligation to pay the money would be a taking entitling Koontz
to just compensation, conditioning permit approval on Koontz’s
surrender of his right to just compensation amounts to conditioning
a government benefit on the surrender of a constitutional right.155
Under Dolan, exactions that impose such unconstitutional conditions
must have a nexus and be roughly proportional to the ends they seek
to accomplish.156
Second, Chief Justice Roberts’ questions at oral argument suggest
he was thinking about the case in a similar way to the reading
proposed in this Note. To describe what an outright demand for
money in Koontz’s case would have looked like, Chief Justice
Roberts analogized the situation to a requirement that an owner of
a particular piece of property pay $1 million to build a football
stadium.157 The property owner, he stated, should not “have to pay
for the football stadium[] simply because he owns property.”158
The demand would be linked to a discrete asset because, he
explained, the government would in effect be saying, “you are the

153. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600 (alteration in original) (quoting Brown v. Legal
Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003)).
154. Id. at 2600 n.2.
155. See id. at 2598–99 (determining that the exaction was an unconstitutional
condition).
156. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386, 391 (1994).
157. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31–32, 36–37, 49; Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No. 111447), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts
/11-1447.pdf.
158. Id. at 37.
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owner of this property, and if you want to develop it, you’ve got to
build a football stadium.”159
Third, even though this reading of Koontz expands the Court’s
previous holdings on monetary takings, it is not inconsistent with
those holdings. The monetary obligation in Koontz satisfied Justice
Kennedy’s test in Eastern Enterprises because it “operate[d] upon . . .
an identified property interest” and “encumber[ed] an estate in
land,” in the sense that it reduced the property’s value.160 This
application of Justice Kennedy’s words was apparently acceptable
enough to satisfy Justice Kennedy himself, as he joined the majority
opinion in Koontz.161 It is also worth noting that Eastern Enterprises
already had four Justices willing to embrace the idea that the Takings
Clause applied to general demands for money that lacked any
connection to specifically identified assets.162 Thus, the demand in
Koontz really only needed just enough of a connection to Koontz’s
land to attract one additional vote.163
The Court’s prior holdings do not confine this new per se rule only to
real property; the rule could also apply to monetary obligations attached
to any specifically identified asset. The Court has found takings in
confiscations of trade secrets,164 liens on ships,165 and bank accounts166 as

159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment but dissenting in part); see Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600 (noting the
diminished value of the property at issue).
161. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591.
162. See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 503, 522–23 (plurality opinion) (holding, in an
opinion joined by Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, that a general
financial obligation could be a taking).
163. Some Justices still appear to cling to the idea that demanding money,
disconnected from any discrete property interest, should qualify as a taking, even
though that position did not prevail in Eastern Enterprises. At oral argument, Justice
Scalia repeatedly interrogated the counsel for the District about why cash could not
be considered a taking. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 34–35
(“As I understand your position, cash is magical, right? The . . . government can
come . . . into my house, take all of the cash that’s there, and that is not the basis for
a takings claim, right? Because cash is . . . not a taking. Does that make any sense?”).
164. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) (determining
that “health, safety, and environmental data” submitted to a federal agency
contained protected property rights).
165. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960) (holding that the
government’s destruction of the value of liens “had every possible element of a Fifth
Amendment ‘taking’”).
166. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 220, 234–35 (2003)
(finding that the seizure of interest earned from lawyers’ trust accounts constitutes a
taking because that interest was the property of the principal’s owner); Webb’s
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164–65 (1980) (holding that a
county’s keeping the interest earned on interpleader funds required to be
temporarily deposited with the court constituted a taking).
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long as they are specifically identified.167 Thus, if it is a taking to seize
these types of properties, then seizing money by reference to similar
discrete assets would also be a taking under Koontz.
B. Distinguishing Taxes
The per se rule proposed in the previous section leaves an
exception for fees categorized as taxes. This exception is necessitated
by Justice Alito’s emphatic reaffirmation of the principle that the
Takings Clause does not apply to taxes and his assertion that the
distinction has not been difficult to make in practice.168
Determining just what a “tax” is has proven to be a contentious
issue in recent years. National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius,169 in which the Court decided the constitutionality of the
Affordable Care Act, dispelled the notion that the distinction could
be based on whether the legislature calls it a tax or something
else170—a position that Justice Alito and three of the other Justices in
the Koontz majority strongly opposed in Sebelius.171 Sebelius therefore
prevents courts from determining whether a monetary obligation is
subject to a takings analysis or is exempt as a tax by simply relying on
whether the legislature called the obligation a tax.
However, while Sebelius arguably worsens the already existing
conceptual difficulties inherent in distinguishing between taxes and
regulatory fees,172 certain practical considerations regarding the
nature of taxation may render finding a conceptually satisfying
distinction largely unnecessary. First, local governments will rarely, if
ever, cloak a regulatory fee in the guise of taxation to avoid the Nollan
and Dolan tests. State legislatures regulate local government taxation
much more strictly than regulatory fees.173 For example, states often
prohibit local governments from imposing new taxes except through
167. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 541–42 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).
168. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600–01
(2013) (finding it “beyond dispute that [t]axes . . . are not ‘takings’” and
therefore holding that the case did not negatively affect local governments’
abilities to impose taxes or user fees that could impose financial burdens on
property owners (quoting Brown, 538 U.S. at 243 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
169. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
170. See id. at 2594 (holding that the Affordable Care Act’s exaction imposed
on non-purchasers of health insurance was a “tax” despite being called a
“penalty” in the law).
171. See id. at 2651–55 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing, in an opinion joined by
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, that the provision mandating a “penalty”
should be interpreted on its face as a penalty and not a tax).
172. See supra Part I.A.2 (observing scholars’ and courts’ inability to establish a
consistent normative framework for distinguishing taxes from takings).
173. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 218–19.
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voter approval by super majority but allow them to implement impact
fees through administrative action alone.174 Accordingly, local
governments often try to make the exact opposite argument of the
government in Sebeliusthey try to convince state courts that a fee is
not a tax.175 Koontz, therefore, actually complements these state-level
checks on local government revenue practices by placing limits on
regulatory fees that escape categorization as a tax. Furthermore,
once a local government successfully argues that a fee is not a tax for
the purposes of state law, the government is barred by judicial
estoppel from subsequently arguing that it is a tax to avoid the nexus
and proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.176
Second, state courts and scholars have identified certain methods
for distinguishing taxes from regulatory fees that work reasonably
well within individual jurisdictions, even if they are not consistent
with the rules in other jurisdictions. Generally, states tend to look to
the projects that the financial obligations are intended to fund to
determine whether the obligations should be defined as taxes or
fees.177 Charges are more likely to be taxes if they confer benefits
widely on the public,178 but are more likely to be regulatory fees if
they confer benefits to, or mitigate harms from, an individual or a
limited group of people.179 Scholars, on the other hand, tend to
174. Id. at 249.
175. See id. at 249–52 (describing how litigants often challenge fees by asserting
that they are ultra vires taxes).
176. See generally New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (explaining
that judicial estoppel prevents parties from maintaining an argument after
succeeding with a contradictory argument at prior phase of a proceeding).
177. See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 249–52 (providing examples of cases that
classified municipal impact fees as taxes or regulatory fees).
178. Defining taxes in this way directly counters Epstein’s position that taxes
should fund services that benefit taxpayers in proportion to their individual
contributions. See supra notes 12–15, 21 and accompanying text (discussing Epstein’s
argument). Nevertheless, to counter Justice Kagan’s dissent in Koontz, Epstein argues
that taxes can be distinguished in this way for practical purposes. See Richard
Epstein, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District: Of Issues Resolved—
and Shoved Under the Table, POINTOFLAW.COM (June 26, 2013, 1:07 PM), http://www
.pointoflaw.com/archives/2013/06/koontz-v-st-johns-river-water-management-district-ofissues-resolved--and-shoved-under-the-table.php.
179. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 902 P.2d
1347, 1350 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (signaling that regulatory fees should be reasonably
related to the needs of a new development and should confer a benefit on the land
they are imposed upon), aff’d en banc, 930 P.2d 993 (Ariz. 1997); Bldg. Indus. Ass’n
of Cleveland & Suburban Cntys. v. City of Westlake, 660 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995) (differentiating a fee from a tax on real property and specifying that if
the measure is construed as a fee, it may not exceed the cost of providing the
service in question); Trimen Dev. Co. v. King Cnty., 877 P.2d 187, 192 (Wash.
1994) (en banc) (explaining that a charge that helped fund the provision of open
space and recreation was a fee and not a tax because taxes are intended to raise
general revenue).
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maintain that the distinction rests on how the charges are applied.
For example, they claim that charges are more likely to be taxes if
they originate from a legislature, extract money from a broad class of
people, or are applied in a rational or uniform manner.180 They are
more likely to be regulatory fees if they originate from administrative
discretion, extract money from an individual or a limited class of
people, or are applied inconsistently.181
Courts are free to draw from any of these principals to fashion a
distinction applicable in their jurisdictions.
As Justice Kagan
observed in Koontz, courts have not all agreed on the same rule,182 but
when it comes to defining local government fees, perhaps a fifty-state
solution is unnecessary.
CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF KOONTZ
At oral argument in Koontz, Deputy Solicitor General Edwin
Kneedler, who argued as amicus curiae in favor of St. Johns River
Water Management District, had an illuminating exchange with Chief
Justice Roberts on the potential reach of the case.183 Kneedler
explained that if monetary obligations imposed on property owners
were subject to a takings analysis, a wide range of commonly accepted
regulations would be swept in along with them.184 For example, coalfired power plants are always required to build scrubbers to mitigate
the air pollution they contribute, but imposing this requirement as a
condition for a building permit would amount to a monetary
exaction.185 Chief Justice Roberts quickly dismissed this concern by

180. See Peñalver, supra note 38, at 2219–27 (elaborating on various scholarly
attempts to distinguish taxes from regulatory fees, such as the degree to which the
charges originate from the political process, single out individual property owners,
and allow affected parties to organize and protect their interests); see, e.g., John E.
Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1038 (2003)
(highlighting that taxes are typically imposed on a broad population).
181. See supra note 179. For this reason, the Supreme Court may side with the
consensus of states that do not subject monetary exactions that are legislatively
imposed and broadly applicable to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny. See supra note 111
(recognizing the large proportion of states that have adopted this position). Such
exactions take on the character of taxes; thus the Court may choose to consider them
as such and avoid the difficult work of venturing even further into the limbo between
taxes and takings.
182. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2607–08
(2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing state court decisions that come to opposite
conclusions despite nearly identical fees).
183. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 46, 48–49, 52–53.
184. Id. at 46–48.
185. Id. at 48.
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noting that requiring scrubbers would obviously meet the nexus and
rough proportionality tests.186
However, Chief Justice Roberts’s response belies the true impact of
Koontz. First, even subjecting regulatory exactions like the one
Kneedler raised to a nexus and rough proportionality test is a
significant step—one that will undoubtedly invalidate several
regulations that are much closer to the line than scrubbers on coal
plants. Second, Justice Roberts’s reply only considers the impact
Koontz will have when such measures are imposed as conditions for a
permit, not when they are demanded by themselves. Because the
Court has implicitly recognized that monetary obligations attached to
specifically identified pieces of property are per se takings, pollution
control regulations imposed directly on power plantsnot as a
condition for permit approvalmight require the government to
compensate the power companies.
Pollution control regulations are just one category. Countless
regulations are applied directly to the owners of specific parcels of
property requiring them to spend money, not to acquire a building
permit, but just because of the property they own.187 Koontz
therefore, has the power to greatly alter the regulatory state.
But it is also important to understand the limits of Koontz. First, the
case will not make it impossible for governments to regulate in the
public interest.188 At most, the case will require some regulations to
compensate property owners in-kind for the costs they impose.189
Thus, agencies will need to more carefully analyze the costs and
benefits of regulations to justify them. Second, Koontz does not
eliminate impact fees or any other type of exaction.190 Rather, it
requires impact fees to do no more than accomplish their objective—
force developers to internalize the negative externalities of their
developments.191 If local governments adequately demonstrate that
the costs imposed on a developer are no greater than what is

186. Id. at 49.
187. See Brief of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 6–9, Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No. SC09-713)
(noting that several environmental regulations must be site-specific).
188. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595, 2600–01 (maintaining that state and local
governments will still be able to impose property taxes, user fees, and other
regulations that place a financial burden on property owners).
189. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 263–73 (arguing that all regulations
should meet this standard).
190. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2601.
191. Id. at 2595.
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required to address the burdens the developer is causing, the costs
will withstand judicial scrutiny.192
At the very least, Koontz helps reduce the inherent hazard of
letting the political process influence impact fees.193 The nexus and
rough proportionality tests will place a check on the power of
residents to shift too much of the cost of financing public
improvements to newcomers who have no ability to vote.194 Thus, it
represents a step toward achieving the ideal the Takings Clause
represents—“to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.”195

192. Id.
193. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text (explaining how impact fees
enable local governments to achieve political objectives at costs largely borne by
people who are not yet residents but would like to be).
194. See generally Philips v. Town of Clifton Park Water Auth., 730 N.Y.S.2d 565,
567 (App. Div. 2001) (striking down an impact fee because of the financial abuse it
imposed on “newcomers”).
195. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).

